shannon vs decepticon

Two of the top projects in Security, side by side: who leads on each score part and who each one suits, then setup, license, activity and what each review found.

11st of 40 in Security

shannon

Autonomous pentester that exploits web apps and APIs using source analysis

#55th of 40 in Security

decepticon

Autonomous red-team agents that run multi-stage attack chains from an approved plan

Verdict

shannon ranks higher, 92 to 84. Of the 4 score parts we measure for both, shannon leads on 1, decepticon on 2 and 1 is even.

  • Adoptionshannon leads by 39 points, 96 to 57: a wide gap.
  • FreshnessEven at 100.
  • Maintenancedecepticon leads by 8 points, 100 to 92.
  • Agent-readydecepticon leads by 15 points, 70 to 55: a wide gap.

Pick shannon if you are

Developers and small security teams pentesting their own apps in staging or CI

  • Reports only exploits with a reproducible proof of concept, which cuts speculative findings
  • Outputs PDF, Markdown, JSON and SARIF 2.1.0, with GitHub and GitLab CI integrations

Pick decepticon if you are

Authorized red teamers and pentesters automating engagements

  • Reports 102/104 (98.08%) on XBOW validation benchmarks, with per-challenge results published
  • Persistent tmux sessions let interactive tools like msfconsole and evil-winrm work
shannon vs decepticon: score parts and facts
What we compareshannondecepticon
Score parts, out of 100
Adoption96, widely used57, popular
Freshness100, active100, active
Maintenance92, healthy100, healthy
Agent-ready55, partly70, partly
Facts from GitHub and the README
Stars52.1k6.6k
LicenseAGPL-3.0 (copyleft)Apache-2.0 (permissive)
Last commitNov 2026Nov 2026
Last releaseNov 2026Oct 2026
LanguageTypeScriptPython
DockerYesYes
GPUNot neededNot needed
arm64 or Apple SiliconNot statedMentioned

shannon

Shannon reads a target app's source, builds a queue of candidate attack paths, then uses browser automation and CLI tools to try real exploits against the running app. Only findings with a working proof of concept reach the PDF, Markdown, JSON or SARIF 2.1.0 report. It runs from an npx launcher with a Docker worker, and has GitHub Actions and GitLab CI components that can fail a pipeline on exploited vulnerabilities.

Who it is for: Developers and small security teams pentesting their own apps in staging or CI

Strengths

  • Reports only exploits with a reproducible proof of concept, which cuts speculative findings
  • Outputs PDF, Markdown, JSON and SARIF 2.1.0, with GitHub and GitLab CI integrations
  • Bring your own key: Anthropic, OpenAI, xAI, Bedrock, gateways, or local Ollama, vLLM, LM Studio
  • Supports authenticated scans (login flows, TOTP) and resumable workspaces

Weaknesses

  • Needs the target's source code; black-box testing is only in paid editions
  • Actively executes exploits, so it must not be run against production
  • Covers injection, XSS, SSRF, authentication and authorization only
  • Claude Code subscriptions unsupported after version 1.9.0; AGPL-3.0 license
  • no GPU
  • Docker + Compose
  • Needs Docker, Node.js 22+, LLM provider credentials
  • Models: Anthropic, OpenAI, xAI, AWS Bedrock, Ollama

decepticon

Decepticon is a red-team system with 16 specialist agents covering recon, exploitation, post-exploitation, AD, cloud and reversing. Commands run in persistent tmux sessions inside a Kali sandbox on a separate network, and findings go to a Neo4j knowledge graph. Models are routed through LiteLLM, and it ships a terminal CLI, an on-demand web dashboard and an MCP server for Claude Code and Codex.

Who it is for: Authorized red teamers and pentesters automating engagements

Strengths

  • Reports 102/104 (98.08%) on XBOW validation benchmarks, with per-challenge results published
  • Persistent tmux sessions let interactive tools like msfconsole and evil-winrm work
  • Kali sandbox runs on its own network, separate from the management plane
  • Supports ten providers including local Ollama, with tiered fallback chains

Weaknesses

  • Needs Docker Compose with several services: LiteLLM, PostgreSQL, Neo4j, LangGraph, sandbox
  • LangGraph drives the sandbox through the Docker socket, which widens host exposure
  • Offensive Vaccine defense loop is described as planned, not shipped
  • Hosted app and commercial demo are promoted; the gap to the open-source CLI is unclear
  • no GPU
  • Docker + Compose
  • Needs Docker, Docker Compose v2, LiteLLM, PostgreSQL, Neo4j, LangGraph
  • Models: Anthropic, OpenAI, Google Gemini, MiniMax, DeepSeek

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